This paper presents a consensus protocol resilient to Byzantine failures. It uses signed and certified messages and is based on two underlying failure detection modules. The first is an unreliable failure detector module of the class 3S (bz). The second is a reliable arbitrary behavior detection module. More precisely, the first module detects processes that stop sending messages, while processes experiencing other arbitrary behaviors are detected by the second module. The protocol is resilient to F faulty processes,
Introduction
Consensus is a fundamental paradigm for fault-tolerant asynchronous distributed systems. Each process proposes a value to the others. All correct processes have to agree (Termination) on the same value (Agreement) which must be one of the initially proposed values (Validity). Solving consensus in asynchronous distributed systems where processes can crash is a well-known difficult task: Fischer, Lynch and Paterson have proved an impossibility result [6] stating that there is no deterministic solution to the consensus problem in the presence of even a single crash failure. A way to circumvent this impossibility result is to use the concept of unreliable failure detectors introduced by Chandra and Toueg [3] . Each process is equipped with a failure detector module that provides it with a list of processes currently suspected by the detector to have crashed. A failure detector module can make mistakes by not suspecting a crashed process or by erroneously suspecting a correct one. Formally, a failure detector module is defined by two properties: completeness (a property on the actual detection of process crashes), and accuracy (a property that restricts the mistakes on erroneous suspicions). Among those classes, the weakest one that allows to solve the consensus problem in a process crash failure model, denoted 3S , is based on strong completeness (eventually every crashed process is detected by every correct process) and eventual weak accuracy (there is a time after which some correct process is not suspected by any correct process).
Solving consensus in an environment where processes can exhibit arbitrary behavior (e.g., omit to execute a statement or corrupt the value of a local variable) is notably difficult. Malkhi and Reiter [9] have been the first to address this problem, by extending failure detectors to cope with Byzantine failures. They have introduced a failure detector class 3S (bz) based on the notion of quiet process. A process p is quiet if there does exist a time after which some correct process does not receive anymore messages from p. (Note that a crashed process is a quiet process). 3S (bz) is a failure detector with a strong completeness property and an eventual weak accuracy property. Here, strong completeness means that each correct process eventually suspects each quiet process. Kihlstrom, Moser and Melliar-Smith [8] have pointed out that messages need to be certified as well as signed. The signature allows a receiver to verify the sender while the certificate is a well-defined amount of redundant information carried by messages that allows a receiver to check if the content of a message is valid and if the sending of the message was done "at the right time". In other word, a certificate allows a receiver to "look into the sender process" in order to see if the actions that produced the sending were correct. Doudou and Schiper have pointed out that the traditional validity property is not adequate to define the consensus problem in a Byzantine setting [5] . A Byzantine process can initially propose an irrelevant value (i.e., a value different from the one it should propose) and then behave correctly. There is no way for the other processes to detect this failure. Consequently, the set of correct processes could agree on an irrelevant value v proposed by a process. To circumvent this drawback, they have introduced a new validity property, namely the Vector Validity property. In this case, each process proposes a vector which contains a certain number (at least one) of correct entries (this problem is called vector consensus). An entry is correct if it is from a correct process. So, processes have first to construct these vectors. Finally, processes agree on one of these vectors. They have also defined a failure detector class (3M ) based on the notion of Mute process, close to the notion of quiet process introduced by Malkhi and Reiter. Using 3M and properly signed and certified messages, they have proposed a protocol that solves Vector Consensus. The failure detector 3M is unreliable, and detects only mute processes. The detection of other Byzantine failures (statement omission, value corruption, etc.) is not performed by this failure detector, and is left to the protocol itself.
In this paper, we propose a protocol to solve Vector Consensus in a Byzantine asynchronous distributed system. This protocol is based on a failure detector of the class 3S (bz), and uses signed and certified messages. Let F denote the maximum number of faulty processes. It assumes F ≤ min( (n − 1)/2 ,C) where C is the maximum number of faulty processes the underlying certification service used by the protocol can cope with 1 . Our approach clearly separates the constraints due to the underlying certification mechanism from the constraints due to the consensus protocol that uses this mechanism. The protocol uses as a skeleton a consensus protocol designed by Hurfin and Raynal [7] for the crash failure model, and extends it to cope with the following "bad" process behaviors: crash, omission of a statement, multiple execution of a statement, corruption of a local variable and misevaluation of a local predicate. The resulting protocol satisfies Agreement, Termination and Vector Validity with at least α = n − 2F entries from correct processes (note that, due to definition of F, we have α ≥ 1. So, the proposed protocol allows to solve other agreement problems, such as Atomic Broadcast).
In the proposed protocol, each process is actually composed of five modules: (i) a consensus module, (ii) an unreliable failure detection module of the class 3S (bz), (iii) an arbitrary behavior detection module, (iv) a certification module and (v) a signature module. The consensus module executes the protocol. The unreliable failure detection module of the class 3S (bz) and the arbitrary behavior detection module are used to reveal quiet processes, and processes with other Byzantine behaviors, respectively. If the process is Byzantine, these three modules can behave in a Byzantine way. The other two modules do not behave maliciously. The signature module filters out messages in which the sender must be identified. The certification module manages certificates to be associated with messages.
Note that the previous Byzantine consensus protocols leave to the protocol itself the detection of faulty processes not captured by the unreliable failure detector 3S (bz) (or 3M ). The introduction of an arbitrary behavior detection module, separated from the consensus protocol, is a new approach that provides a general, efficient, modular and simple way to extend distributed protocols to cope with Byzantine failures. A more general methodological approach has been presented by the authors in [2] .
Moreover, an implementation of the arbitrary behavior detection module is described. This implementation is based on a set of finite state automata, one for each process. At the operational level, the module associated with a process p i intercepts all messages sent to p i from the underlying network and checks if their sendings are done according to the program specification. In the affirmative, it relays the message to p i 's consensus module. This module maintains a set (byzantine i ) of processes it detected to experience at least one Byzantine behavior. Differently from the failure detector module 3S (bz), the arbitrary behavior detection module is reliable (i.e., if the process to which it belongs is correct, it does not make mistake).
The paper is made of seven sections. Section 2 addresses the consensus problem in a crash failure model. Section 3 presents the Byzantine asynchronous distributed system model. Then Section 4 presents the Byzantine consensus protocol. Section 5 provides a finite state automaton-based implementation of the arbitrary behavior detection module. Due to space limitations, the automaton states and transitions and the proof of correctness of the proposed protocol are omitted. They can be found in [1] .
A Consensus Protocol in the Crash Failure Model
This section provides a brief description of Hurfin-Raynal's protocol [7] in a version that assumes FIFO channels (this constraint is not required by the original protocol). It solves the consensus problem in a distributed asynchronous system where processes can fail by crashing, and uses a failure detector of class S (presented in [3] ). As other consensus protocols, this one proceeds in successive asynchronous rounds and uses the rotating coordinator paradigm. During a round, a predetermined process (the round coordinator) tries to impose a value as the decision value. To attain this goal, each process votes: either (vote CURRENT) in favor of the value proposed by the round coordinator (when it has received one), or (vote NEXT) to proceed to the next round and benefit from a new coordinator (when it suspects the current coordinator).
During each round, the behavior of each process p i is determined by a finite state automaton. This automaton is composed of 3 states. The local variable state i will denote the automaton state in which p i currently is. During a round, the states of the automaton have the following meaning:
• state i = q 0 : p i has not yet voted (q 0 is the automaton initial state).
• state i = q 1 : p i has voted CURRENT and has not changed its mind (p i moves from q 0 to q 1 ).
• state i = q 2 : p i has voted NEXT. In addition to the local variable state i , process p i manages the following four local variables:
• r i defines the current round number.
• est i contains the current estimation by p i of the decision value.
• nb current i (resp. nb next i ) counts the number of CURRENT (resp. NEXT) votes received by p i during the current round.
• rec f rom i is a set composed of the process identities from which p i has received a (CURRENT or NEXT) vote during the current round.
Finally, suspected i is a set managed by the associated failure detector module (cf. Section 3.2); p i can only read this set.
The protocol manages the progression of each process p i within its automaton, according to the following rules. At the beginning of round r, state i = q 0 . Then, during r, the transitions are:
• Transition q 0 → q 1 (p i first votes CURRENT). This transition occurs when p i , while in the initial state q 0 , receives a CURRENT vote (line 7). This means that p i has not previously suspected the round coordinator (line 12). Moreover, when p i moves to q 1 and it is not the current coordinator, it broadcasts a CURRENT vote (line 10).
• Transition q 0 → q 2 (p i first votes NEXT). This transition occurs when p i , while in the initial state q 0 , suspects the current coordinator (line 12). This means that p i has not previously received a CURRENT vote. Moreover, when p i moves to q 2 , it broadcasts a NEXT vote.
• Transition q 1 → q 2 (p i changes its mind). This transition (executed by statements at line 14) is used to prevent a possible deadlock. A process p i that has issued a CURRENT vote is allowed to change its mind if p i has received a (CUR-RENT or NEXT) vote from a majority of processes (i.e., | rec f rom i |> n/2) but has received neither a majority of CURRENT votes (so it cannot decide), nor a majority of NEXT votes (so it cannot progress to the next round). Then p i changes its mind in order to make the protocol progress: it broadcasts a NEXT vote to favor the transition to the next round.
Protocol Description Function consensus() consists of two concurrent tasks. The first task handles the receipt of a DECIDE message (line 2); it ensures that if a process p i decides (line 2 or line 11), then all correct processes will also receive a DECIDE message. The second task (lines 3-17) describes a round: it consists of a loop that constitutes the core of the protocol. Each (CURRENT or NEXT) vote is (6) while (nb next i ≤ n/2) do % wait until a branch can be selected, and then execute it % (7)
upon receipt of CURRENT(p k , r i , est k ) (8) nb current i := nb current i + 1; rec f rom i := rec f rom i ∪ {p k }; (9) if (nb current i = 1) then est i := est k endif; (10) if labeled with its round number 2 .
• At the beginning of a round r, the current coordinator p c proposes its estimate v c to become the decision value by broadcasting a CURRENT vote carrying this value (line 5).
• Each time a process p i receives a (CURRENT or NEXT) vote, it updates the corresponding counter and the set rec f rom i (lines 8 and 13).
• When a process receives a CURRENT vote for the first time, it adopts est k as its current estimate est i (line 9). If, in addition, it is in state q 0 , it moves to state q 1 (line 10).
• A process p i decides on an estimate proposed by the current coordinator as soon as it has received a majority of CURRENT votes, i.e., a majority of votes that agree to conclude during the current round (line 11).
• When a process progresses from round r to round r + 1 it issues a NEXT (line 16) if it did not do it in the while loop. These NEXT votes are used to prevent other processes from remaining blocked in round r (line 6).
Consensus in a Byzantine Model

The Model
Byzantine Processes A correct process is a process that does not exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A process is Byzantine if, during its execution, one of the following faults occurs: Crash. The process stops executing statements of its program and halts. Corruption. The process changes arbitrarily the value of a local variable (i.e., arbitrary assignment) with respect to its program specification. This incorrect value could be included in the content of a message sent by the faulty process. Omission. The process omits to execute a statement of its program. If a process omits to execute an assignment, this could lead to a corruption fault. Duplication The process executes more than one time a statement of its program. Note that if a process executes an assignment more than one time, this could lead to a corruption fault. Misevaluation The process misevaluates an expression included in its program. This fault is different from a corruption fault: misevaluating an expression does not imply the update of the variables involved in the expression and, in some cases (e.g., conditions used in if and loop statements) the result of an evaluation is not assigned to a variable.
Distinction between misevaluation and corruption is extremely important, particularly in the case of conditions. Conditions involving local variables can be misleading because of a corruption fault, even though no misevaluation occurred. Certificates The usage of a key cryptosystem does not allow a receiver (i) to verify the correctness of the content of a message nor (ii) to check if the sender process has correctly followed its program specification. To address these two problems, each message contains a certificate which represents a properly formed set of messages. This set is used by the receiver to check the correctness of the content of a message and the proper sending of the message. Hence, with each type of messages used by the consensus protocol we have to associate a proper certificate that will allow a receiver to check points (i) and (ii). To check point (i), usual certification techniques are based on "majority" rules. So, they require that proper certificates contain at least n−C messages, able to "witness" the content of the message. Usually, n −C = 2n+1 3
(recall that we assume F ≤ min(
, n −C) processes are correct). We denote as m, cert m i a message m signed and sent, with the certificate cert m , by p i . m, cert m i is properly formed if its certificate is a properly formed set of messages. Each certificate is updated in a safe way (i.e., no corruption fault can occur) by a process (i.e., if a process forges a certificate, it will be immediately detected by the receiver as a Byzantine process) and a process can safely query about the cardinality of a given certificate. Note that the fact that p i cannot corrupt a given certificate does not prevent p i 's misevaluation faults.
Structure of a Process
A process consists of five modules whose role has been presented in the introduction. The structure of a process p i is given in Figure 2 . The same figure also shows the path followed by a message m (resp. m ) received (resp. sent) by p i .
Signature module Each message arriving at p i is first processed by this module which verifies the signature of the sender (by using its public key). If the signature of the message is inconsistent with the identity field contained in the message, the message is discarded and its sender identity (known thanks to the unforgeable signature), is passed to the arbitrary behavior detection module to be added to the set byzantine i . Otherwise, the message is passed to the local failure detection module 3S (bz). Also, each message sent by p i is signed by the signature module just before leaving the process. So, if the sender identity contained in the message is corrupted, this will be discovered by the receiver signature module.
Failure detection module of the class 3S (bz)
This module manages the set suspected i . It is devoted to the detection of quiet processes [9] . It can be implemented by a set of time-outs. Upon the receipt of a message sent by process p k , the signature module of p i resets the local timer associated with p k and, if p k ∈ suspected i , removes p k from that set. Then, the message is passed to p i 's arbitrary behavior detection module. When the timer associated with p k expires, p k is appended to suspected i . It is important to note that, due to asynchrony, the implementation of the Eventual Weak Accuracy property of 3S (bz) can at best be approximate.
Arbitrary behavior detection module
This module receives messages from the failure detection module 3S (bz) and checks if they are properly formed and follow the program specification of the sender. In the affirmative, it passes the message to p i 's certification module. This module maintains a set (byzantine i ) of processes it detected to experience at least one Byzantine behavior such as duplication, corruption or misevaluation. We say "process p i declares p j to be Byzantine" at some time, if, at that time, p j ∈ byzantine i . Note that differently from the failure detector module, the arbitrary behavior detection module is reliable (i.e., if p j ∈ byzantine i , then p j has experienced an incorrect behavior detected by the arbitrary behavior detection module of p i ). Finally, as for the set suspected i , p i 's consensus module can only read byzantine i . Let us note that byzantine i cannot be corrupted by process p i 's consensus module, but, this does not prevent p i 's consensus module to misevaluate an expression involving byzantine i (e.g., p j ∈ byzantine i is evaluated to false by p i even though it was actually true).
Section 5 is devoted to the implementation of the arbitrary behavior detection modules.
Certification Module This module is responsible, upon the receipt of a message from the arbitrary behavior detection module, for updating the corresponding certificate local variable. It is also in charge to append properly formed certificates to the messages that are sent by p i .
A Byzantine Consensus Protocol
Each of the previously proposed protocols solving consensus in Byzantine systems is based on a skeleton protocol solving consensus in a process crash model. [8] uses [3] , and [5] uses [10] . We have chosen Hurfin-Raynal's protocol as a skeleton for our Byzantine consensus protocol because, in addition to its conceptual simplicity, this protocol is particularly efficient when the underlying failure detector makes no mistakes, whether there are failures or not.
Local Variables
Since a Byzantine process can corrupt its own local variables, their values should be carefully certified.
• nb current i (resp. nb next i ) can be replaced by using the cardinality of the certificate current cert i (resp. next cert i ) which contains properly formed CUR-RENT (resp. NEXT) votes received in the current round.
• • rec f rom i can be replaced by the variable REC FROM i using certificates in the following way:
The predicate change mind For the sake of brevity, let change mind denote the following predicate:
This predicate corresponds to the predicate (state i = q 1 ) ∧ (| rec f rom i |> n/2) used in the line 17 of the protocol shown in Figure 1 .
Note that the only variables that cannot be replaced by the use of certificates are the round number (r), the coordinator (c, which directly depends on r) and the current estimates (est vect). Then, their values must be authenticated by certificates as explained below.
Certificates Attached to Messages
Four types of messages are exchanged, namely, INIT, CURRENT, NEXT and DE-CIDE. Each time a message m (INIT, CURRENT, NEXT) is received by the certification module, m is appended to a local variable keeping the corresponding certificates (est cert, current cert or next cert, respectively). These statements are depicted inside a box in the protocol described in Figure 3 .
Each time a process p i sends a message m, according to the type of m, an appropriate certificate is associated with m by the certification module. This certificate depends on the protocol statement that issues the sending of m. This certificate will be used by the arbitrary behavior detection module of the receiver to check the proper sending of m.
Certifying initial values for Vector Consensus For each process p i , the first problem lies in obtaining a vector of proposed values (certified vector) that verifies the Vector Validity property (Section 3). This certified vector will then be used as the value proposed by p i to the consensus protocol.
This certification procedure is similar to the one proposed by Doudou and Schiper in [5] . It is described in the protocol of Figure 3 (line 4 to line 9). Each process initially broadcasts its value v i and then waits for (n − F) values from other processes. Each time p i receives a value, the message is added to est cert i .
Exiting from the initial while loop (lines 6-9) we say that "est cert i is wellformed with respect to a value est vect i " if the following conditions are satisfied:
• |est cert i | = (n − F) (otherwise process p k has either omitted to execute the receipt of line 7 or misevaluated the condition of line 6), and
• The value est vect i is correct with respect to the (n − F) INIT messages contained in est cert i . Otherwise process p i either has omitted to execute the update of est vect i (line 8), or has corrupted its value (intuitively, this means that those (n − F) messages "witness" that est vect i is a correct value, because n − F ≥ n −C).
Certifying estimate values
The initial value of est vect i (obtained when exiting from lines 4-9) is certified by est cert i , as explained above. This variable can then take successive values: it can be updated at most once per round (line 17) due to the delivery of the first CURRENT message received during this round (line 15). When this occurs, the certificate est cert i is also updated. Since this message is properly formed, its certificate cert k contains a correct certificate est cert k (i.e., a certificate well-formed with respect to the value est vect k contained in the CUR-RENT message). During a round, est cert i is said to be "well-formed with respect to est vect i " if the value est vect i is the value included in the (n − F) messages contained in est cert k . Otherwise, it means that process p i has either omitted to execute the update of est vect i (line 17), or corrupted its value.
From round r − 1 to round r A process progresses from round r − 1 to round r when the predicate of line 14 is false. When a new round r starts, we say that next cert i is well-formed with respect to r − 1 if the following conditions are satisfied:
• |next cert i | = (n − F) and r > 1 (otherwise process p i has misevaluated the condition of line 14).
• The value r − 1 is consistent with respect to the information in the (n − F) NEXT messages contained in est cert i (i.e., all messages refer to round r − 1. Otherwise process p k has corrupted the value of r at line 11).
• If r = 1, then next cert i = / 0 (Otherwise either p i has corrupted r or c (line 11) or has misevaluated the condition of line 12).
Protocol Description
The text of the protocol is presented in Figure 3 . In the following, a valid vote means a properly signed and formed vote (CURRENT or NEXT).
• At the beginning of a round r, the current coordinator p c proposes its estimate est vect c to become the decision value by broadcasting a CURRENT vote carrying this value (line 12). This vote is certified by est cert c ∪ next cert c . est cert c is used to certify the value proposed by the coordinator est vect c . i.e., est cert c must be well formed wrt est vect c . next cert c is used to certify the value of the current round r (i.e., next cert c must be well formed wrt r − 1).
• When p i receives the first CURRENT valid vote while in state q 0 (line 17). It relays a CURRENT vote (line 19) by using the valid vote CURRENT just received as a certificate. This certificate contains est cert c ∪ next cert c used to certify r and est vect c (as above).
• If, while it is in the initial state q 0 , p i suspects the current coordinator, it broadcasts a NEXT vote (line 24) and moves to q 2 . This vote is certified by est cert i ∪ current cert i ∪ next cert i . Certificates current cert i and next cert i will be used by the arbitrary behavior detection module of the receiver to decide whether p i has misevaluated or not the sending condition (at line 23). Moreover, as NEXT votes can also be sent at lines 29 and 31, est cert i is used to allow the receiver to determine the condition that has triggered the NEXT vote it receives.
• When the predicate at line 28 becomes true, in order to avoid a deadlock, process p i broadcasts a NEXT vote to favor the transition to the next round (line 29). This vote is certified by current cert i ∪ next cert i . current cert i and next cert i are used to certify the non-misevaluation of the predicate change mind.
• When a process progresses from round r to round r + 1 it issues a NEXT vote if it did not do it in the while loop. These NEXT votes are used to prevent other processes from remaining blocked in round r (line 31). This vote is certified by next cert i which will allow a receiver to check the correct evaluation of the condition at line 14 by verifying if next cert i is well formed wrt r.
Taking a Decision
A process decides a value est vect c at round r either when it has received (n − F) valid CURRENT votes (lines 20-21) or when it receives a properly signed and formed DECIDE message from another process (lines 2-3). In the first case the process authenticates its decision by using a well-formed current cert i as a cer- 
upon receipt of a properly signed and formed Figure 4 : The p i 's arbitrary behavior detection module to monitor process p k .
tificate (line 21), in the second case the message (with the same certificate) is relayed to the other processes (line 3). We say that current cert i is well formed wrt r and est vect if the following conditions are satisfied:
• |current cert i | = (n − F) (otherwise process p i misevaluated the condition of line 20).
• the certificate of each message in current cert i contains a est cert c well formed with respect to est vect.
• the certificate of each message in current cert i contains a next cert well formed with respect to r.
The Arbitrary Behavior Detection Module
The arbitrary behavior detection module of process p i is composed of a set of finite state automata, one for each process. This module detects if a given process p k has suffered a Byzantine fault. This detection is carried out in two steps. (i) It is first checked if a certificate of a message is well formed with respect to the value carried by this message. It is then (ii) checked if the type of the message follows the program specification (i.e., if it has been sent at the right time). If one of these steps detects something wrong, the automaton falls in the state byz which means p k is Byzantine, furthermore, the message is discarded. Otherwise, the message is passed to the consensus module of process p i .
The automaton of p i related to p k is depicted Figure 4 . Due to space limitations, the automaton states and transitions and the proof of correctness are omitted. They can be found in [1] .
